(In)Security of an Efficient Fingerprinting Scheme with Symmetric and Commutative Encryption of IWDW 2005

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Abstract. We analyze the security of a fingerprinting scheme proposed at IWDW 2005. We show two results, namely that this scheme (1) does not provide *seller security*: a dishonest buyer can repudiate the fact that he redistributed a content, and (2) does not provide *buyer security*: a buyer can be framed by a malicious seller.

Keywords: Watermarking, fingerprinting, security issues, combination of data hiding and cryptography, buyer-seller, traceability, no framing.

1 Introduction

Two of the most celebrated applications of watermarking are *copyright protection* and *piracy protection*. For this, a robust watermarking scheme is employed to embed the content owner's mark to prove his ownership; and to embed a mark (so called a fingerprint) of the content buyer so that the content binds to the buyer and any dishonest buyer who later redistributes this content can be traced.

An interesting body of literature in watermarking has formed around the design and analysis of buyer-seller watermarking (BSW) schemes, which are typically protocols that allow marks identifying both the seller (it is commonly assumed that the owner is the seller) and the buyer to be embedded into the content, so that copyright and piracy protection can be provided. In addition to ensuring this basic *seller security*, BSW schemes also provide *buyer security* [34], i.e., a buyer is assured that he cannot be framed by malicious sellers.

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Related Work. It turns out that designing secure BSW schemes is more subtle than first thought. For instance, the original proposal that highlighted the need to provide buyer security in [34], was shown inadequate in [25] since the seller knows the final copy of the fingerprinted content and may well have redistributed this itself.

Meanwhile, a few subsequent BSW schemes proposed with different additional features like anonymity [20], without trusted third parties (TTP) [10] and extension for multiple purchases [11] were later found to have security problems [10, 19, 18]. A few more recent schemes can be found in [24, 37, 38].

BSW schemes typically employ techniques from both watermarking and cryptography. See [13, 21, 33] for cautions when integrating the two fields.

This Paper. We show the first known analysis of a recent BSW scheme proposed by Yong and Lee at IWDW 2005 [37]. Our results indicate that this scheme does not provide seller security and buyer security, properties that are desired by any basic BSW scheme.

Section 2 gives the preliminaries and notations used throughout this paper. We describe the Yong-Lee BSW scheme in Section 3, and then present our attacks in Section 4. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.

2 Preliminaries

We list here basic requirements of a secure anonymous buyer-seller watermarking scheme (the interested reader can refer to [25, 37] for details):

- **Traceability**. The buyer who has illegally redistributed watermarked contents can be traced.
- **Non-Repudiation**. The guilty buyer cannot deny having created unauthorized copies of the content.
- **Non-Framing**. No one can accuse an honest buyer.
- **Privacy: Anonymity and Unlinkability**. Without obtaining an illegally distributed copy, the seller cannot identify the buyer. Also, the purchases of honest buyers should not be linkable even by a collusion of all sellers, registration center and other buyers.

Note that in any BSW schemes, it is assumed that the underlying watermarking scheme used for embedding is collusion-tolerant and robust.

2.1 Cryptographic Preliminaries

In a *public key cryptosystem* [26], each party A possesses a pair of public-private key (y_A, x_A) which is obtainable from a certificate authority or registration center RC. For convenience, we let $y_A \equiv g^{x_A} \bmod p$ [26], where p is a large prime and g is a generator of the multiplication group $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ of order $(p-1)$. Also, unless otherwise specified, all arithmetic operations are performed in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Any party can encrypt a message for A using y_A, but only A can decrypt this message with x_A. This ensures *confidentiality*. Furthermore, A can sign a message by encrypting it with x_A, denoted as $sign_{x_A}(M)$, so that anybody can verify by using y_A that the message really originated from A. This provides *authentication* and *non-repudiation*.

Both the seller and the buyer have registered with the registration center RC, and have their own pair of keys which are (y_A, x_A) and (y_B, x_B), respectively. Note that the RC also has its own public-private key pair (y_{RC}, x_{RC}).

2.2 Notations

For ease of explanation, we use the following common notations for BSW schemes:

S	the seller who owns and sells the digital content X
B	the buyer who buys the digital content
RC	registration center who can issue certificates
J	the judge
$\otimes$	fingerprint embedding (watermarking) operation
X	original content with t elements $(x_1, x_2, ..., x_t)$
X'	fingerprinted content, where $X' = X \otimes F$ for a fingerprint F
$H(\cdot)$	collision-resistant hash function
$E_U(x)$	public-key encryption of x under party U's public key
$Enc_K(x)$	symmetric-key encryption of x under secret key K
$CEnc_K(x)$	commutative symmetric-key encryption of x under secret key K

3 The Yong-Lee Anonymous BSW Scheme

We describe the anonymous BSW scheme proposed by Yong and Lee proposed at IWDW 2005 [37]. As is common for this type of scheme, it consists of three phases; i.e. *registration*, *fingerprinting* and *identification*. For simplicity, we depict the registration phase and fingerprinting phase in Fig. 1.

Buyer, B		**Registration Center,** RC
Randomly select:		
$x_1, x_2 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ s.t. $x_1 + x_2 = x_B$		
Compute y_1 and encrypt x_2:		
$y_1 = g^{x_1}$, $E_{RC}(x_2)$	$\xrightarrow{y_B, y_1, E_{RC}(x_2)}$	Decrypt $E_{RC}(x_2)$ using x_{RC}
		Compute: $y_2 = g^{x_2}$
		Check: $y_1 \cdot y_2 \stackrel{?}{=} y_B$
	$\xleftarrow{Cert(y_1)}$	If pass, return $Cert(y_1)$

(a) Registration Phase

Buyer, B		**Seller,** S
	$\xrightarrow{y_1, Cert(y_1), payment}$	Verify $Cert(y_1)$ (using y_{RC}).
		If pass, generate and embed:
		$F_B^i = \{f_B^{i,1}, f_B^{i,2}, \ldots, f_B^{i,t}\}$
		$X^i = \{x^{i,1}, x^{i,2}, \ldots, x^{i,t}\}, i = \{0,1\}$.
		$X_B^i = \{x_B^{i,1}, x_B^{i,2}, \ldots, x_B^{i,t}\}$ where
		$x_B^{i,j} = x^{i,j} \otimes f_B^{i,j}$
		Generate 2 secret keys K_0 and K_1:
		$K_i = \{k_{i,1}, k_{i,2}, \ldots, k_{i,t}\}, i = \{0,1\}$.
		Encrypt and obtain:
		$\mathcal{X}_B^i = \{\mathbf{x}_B^{i,1}, \mathbf{x}_B^{i,2}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_B^{i,t}\} = Enc_{K_i}(X_B^i)$
		Encrypt K_0 and K_1 (using K_S):
		$C_i = \{CEnc_{K_S}(k_{i,1}), CEnc_{K_S}(k_{i,2}), \ldots, CEnc_{K_S}(k_{i,t})\}$
		$= \{c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}, \ldots, c_{i,t}\}$
	$\xleftarrow{\mathcal{X}_B^0, \mathcal{X}_B^1, C_0, C_1}$	
Randomly generate:		
$L_B = \{l_1, l_2, \ldots, l_t\}$		
for $l_j = \{0,1\}$		
Then construct:		
$C' = \{c'_1, c'_2, \ldots, c'_t\}$		
where $c'_j = c_{l_j, j}$		
Encrypts C' (using K_R):		
$D_1 = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_{\frac{t}{2}}\}$ and		
$D_2 = \{d_{\frac{t}{2}+1}, \ldots, d_t\}$, where		
$d_i = CEnc_{K_R}(c'_i)$.	$\xrightarrow{D_1}$	Decrypt D_1 with K_S:
		$U_1 = \{u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{\frac{t}{2}}\}$, where
Decrypt U_1 (using K_R).	$\xleftarrow{U_1}$	$u_i = CEnc_{K_S}^{-1}(d_i) = CEnc_{K_R}(k_{l_j, j})$.
Then, decrypt 1^{th} $t/2$ frames:		
$\mathbf{x}_B^{l_j, j}$ for $j = \{1, 2, \ldots, \frac{t}{2}\}$.		
Generate:		
$T_B = E_J(L_B)$ and $sig_{x_1}(T_B)$	$\xrightarrow{T_B, sig_{x_1}(T_B), D_2}$	Verify (using y_1) $sig_{x_1}(T_B)$
		If verified, it decrypts D_2 with K_S:
Decrypt U_2 (using K_R).	$\xleftarrow{U_2, sig_{x_S}(T_B)}$	$U_2 = \{u_{\frac{t}{2}+1}, \ldots, u_t\}$
Then, decrypt 2^{nd} $t/2$ frames:		
$X_B = \{x_B^{l_1,1}, x_B^{l_2,2}, \ldots, x_B^{l_t,t}\}$.	$\xrightarrow{TN_B = E_J(H(X_B), H(X_B) \oplus H(L_B))}$	Record $Rec_B =$
		$\langle y_1, Cert(y_1), F_B^0, F_B^1, T_B, sig_{x_1}(T_B), TN_B \rangle$

(b) Fingerprinting Phase

Fig. 1. Yong-Lee Anonymous BSW Scheme

Registration. This phase involves two parties: the buyer B and registration center RC. Both are assumed to have public and private key pairs, i.e., x_I is the private key of party I while its public key is $y_I = g^{x_I}$. Certificates issued by RC are signed by its private key x_{RC}, and can be publicly verified by anyone using RC's public key y_{RC}.

1. B randomly chooses two secret values $x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ such that $x_1 + x_2 = x_B \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Then B sends $(y_B, y_1 = g^{x_1}), E_{RC}(x_2)$ to RC, and convinces via zero knowledge to RC of its possession of x_1.
2. RC decrypts $E_{RC}(x_2)$ and computes $y_2 = g^{x_2}$ and checks that $y_1 y_2 = y_B$. If verified, it returns to B a certificate $Cert(y_1)$ which states the correctness of y_1 and the registration of B.

Repeating this phase several times allows B to obtain several different pairs (y_1, x_1) which it will use as its unlinkable and anonymous key pairs.

Fingerprinting. This phase involves two parties: the buyer B and the seller S.

1. B sends y_1, $Cert(y_1)$ and *payment* to S as a purchase request for the digital content X.

2. On receiving this, S verifies $Cert(y_1)$ and generates two fingerprints for B, F_B^0 and F_B^1; i.e.,

$$F_B^i = \{f_B^{i,1}, f_B^{i,2}, \ldots, f_B^{i,t}\}, i = \{0, 1\}.$$

3. S generates two identical copies of the digital content X^0 and X^1, and splits each copy into t frames, i.e.,

$$X^i = \{x^{i,1}, x^{i,2}, \ldots, x^{i,t}\}, i = \{0, 1\}.$$

4. S then embeds F_B^i into each of the t frames of X^i for $i = \{0, 1\}$, by using the specific embedding construction in [14], to obtain

$$X_B^i = \{x_B^{i,1}, x_B^{i,2}, \ldots, x_B^{i,t}\}, i = \{0, 1\},$$

where

$$x_B^{i,j} = x^{i,j} \otimes f_B^{i,j} \quad , i = \{0, 1\}, j = \{1, \ldots, t\}.$$

5. S generates two secret key vectors K_0 and K_1. Each key vector consists of t randomly selected keys:

$$K_i = \{k_{i,1}, k_{i,2}, \ldots, k_{i,t}\}, i = \{0, 1\}.$$

6. S encrypts the each of the t frames of X_B^i ($i = \{0, 1\}$) using each of the t keys of K_i, using symmetric key encryption $Enc_K(\cdot)$. This produces two encrypted digital content vectors of frames, $\mathcal{X}_B^0$ and $\mathcal{X}_B^1$, such that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{X}_B^i &= \{\mathbf{x}_B^{i,1}, \mathbf{x}_B^{i,2}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_B^{i,t}\} \\ &= Enc_{K_i}(X_B^i) \\ &= Enc_{k_{i,j}}(x_B^{i,j}), i = \{0, 1\}, j = \{1, \ldots, t\}.\end{aligned}$$

7. S randomly selects a secret key K_S and encrypts the two key vectors K_0 and K_1 via commutative encryption $CEnc_K(\cdot)$, producing two encrypted key vectors C_0 and C_1, i.e.

$$\begin{aligned}C_i &= \{c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}, \ldots, c_{i,t}\} \\ &= \{CEnc_{K_S}(k_{i,1}), CEnc_{K_S}(k_{i,2}), \ldots, CEnc_{K_S}(k_{i,t})\}, i = \{0, 1\}.\end{aligned}$$

   S sends $(\mathcal{X}_B^0, \mathcal{X}_B^1, C_0, C_1)$ to B.

8. B randomly generates a t-bit integer $L_B = \{l_1, l_2, \ldots, l_t\}$ for $l_j = \{0, 1\}, j = \{1, \ldots, t\}$, restricted to the fact that L_B should not be all 0 or all 1. It then constructs a new encrypted vector $C' = \{c'_1, c'_2, \ldots, c'_t\}$ where $c'_j = c_{l_j,j}$. To elaborate, this means that each c'_j is either $c_{0,j}$ or $c_{1,j}$ depending on the bit l_j of L_B.

9. B randomly chooses a secret key K_R and encrypts C' via commutative encryption to obtain an encrypted vector that it halves into two consecutive parts $D_1 = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_{\frac{t}{2}}\}$ and $D_2 = \{d_{\frac{t}{2}+1}, \ldots, d_t\}$, where

$$\begin{aligned}d_i &= CEnc_{K_R}(c'_i) \\ &= CEnc_{K_R}(CEnc_{K_S}(k_{l_j,j})) \\ &= CEnc_{K_S}(CEnc_{K_R}(k_{l_j,j})).\end{aligned}$$

   B sends D_1 to S.

10. S decrypts D_1 with K_S to get the vector $U_1 = \{u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{\frac{t}{2}}\}$, where

$$\begin{aligned}u_i &= CEnc_{K_S}^{-1}(d_i) \\ &= CEnc_{K_S}^{-1}(CEnc_{K_S}(CEnc_{K_R}(k_{l_j,j}))) \\ &= CEnc_{K_R}(k_{l_j,j}).\end{aligned}$$

    S sends U_1 to B.

11. B now obtains $t/2$ decryption keys by decrypting each u_i with key K_R, and can thus decrypt the first $t/2$ frames of the encrypted digital content $\mathbf{x}_B^{l_j,j}$ for $j = \{1, 2, \ldots, \frac{t}{2}\}$.

12. B generates $T_B = E_J(L_B)$ and a signature $sig_{x_1}(T_B)$. These are evidence for resolving piracy disputes in future. B sends $(T_B, sig_{x_1}(T_B), D_2)$ to S.

13. S verifies $sig_{x_1}(T_B)$ with y_1. If verified, it decrypts D_2 with K_S to obtain the vector $U_2 = \{u_{\frac{t}{2}+1}, \ldots, u_t\}$, where u_i is similar to that in Step (10). S sends $(U_2, sig_{x_S}(T_B))$ to B.

14. B now obtains the remaining $t/2$ decrypting keys by decrypting each u_i of U_2 with key K_R, thus it can decrypt the remaining $t/2$ frames of $\mathcal{X}_B^{l_j,j}$ for $j = \{\frac{t}{2} + 1, \ldots, t\}$. Hence, B now has the complete fingerprinted content X_B, i.e.

$$X_B = \{x_B^{l_1,1}, x_B^{l_2,2}, \ldots, x_B^{l_t,t}\}.$$

B sends $TN_B = E_J(H(X_B), H(X_B) \oplus H(L_B))$ to S.

15. S records $Rec_B = \langle y_1, Cert(y_1), F_B^0, F_B^1, T_B, sig_{x_1}(T_B), TN_B \rangle$ in its database.

Identification. This phase involves three parties: the seller S, the judge J and the registration center RC.

1. After finding an illegally redistributed digital content, S extracts the fingerprint from it. S then sends $\mathcal{X}_B^0$ and $\mathcal{X}_B^1$ with the transaction record Rec_B to the judge J.
2. J decrypts T_B and TN_B and checks that L_B corresponds to $\mathcal{X}_B$, and that T_B was signed by B. It verifies the presence of frames of either F_B^0 or F_B^1 in X_B based on L_B. If all are verified, it sends y_1 to RC and asks for the identity of B, and informs S.

4 Insecurity of the Yong-Lee BSW Scheme

Attacking the Seller Security. The security of the seller is captured by the notion of *traceability* and *non-repudiation*.

Nevertheless, we show how the seller security can be defeated by a malicious buyer. The attack follows.

1. B performs an entire **fingerprinting** protocol session with S, thus in the end B has the content X_B and S has recorded $Rec_B = \langle y_1, Cert(y_1), F_B^0, F_B^1, T_B, sig_{x_1}(T_B), TN_B \rangle$ in its database.
2. B initiates another **fingerprinting** protocol session with S, this time requesting for some other digital content X'. During the protocol, B proceeds normally, except that it reuses the y_1, $Cert(y_1)$, T_B, $sig_{x_1}(T_B)$, TN_B from the previous session. It is clear that S will correctly verify y_1 from $Cert(y_1)$, and T_B from $sig_{x_1}(T_B)$. Furthermore S cannot check TN_B since it is encrypted for only J to decrypt.
3. Thus in the end B obtains the fingerprinted X'_B and S records $Rec'_B = \langle y_1, Cert(y_1), F_B'^0, F_B'^1, T_B, sig_{x_1}(T_B), TN_B \rangle$ in its database.
4. B can repeat this as many times as it wishes. Now B can pirate all the fingerprinted content X'_B it received from its sessions with S except for the first, X_B.
5. When S discovers that X'_B has been redistributed and initiates the **identification** protocol, B can counter that it only bought once from S, for the digital content X_B. It can argue that the other X'_B have nothing to do with him, but that S reused $y_1, Cert(y_1), T_B, sig_{x_1}(T_B)$, TN_B to frame him for distributing X'_B.
6. The judge J cannot reach a conclusion in favour of S because TN_B will not correspond to X'_B since it corresponds only to X_B.

This attack shows to some extent a failure of *traceability* since B cannot be judged guilty for redistributing X'_B. This also shows a failure of *non-repudiation* because the only part that binds to B for which B cannot repudiate is $T_B = E_J(L_B)$, which is independent of the digital content bought by B.

Attacking the Buyer Security. The security of the buyer is captured by the notion of *non-framing*. Additionally, when privacy is desired then this is captured by *anonymity* and *unlinkability*.

We demonstrate two cases for which *non-framing* can be violated. The first follows, by exploiting T_B.

1. S guesses all possible values of L_B and for each guess checks if $T_B = E_J(L_B)$. Since L_B is only a 32-bit vector, this requires just 2^{32} trials.
2. S does the **fingerprinting** protocol steps 3 and 4 for X', where the old fingerprints F_B^0 and F_B^1 are reused, and embedded into any other content X' for which S wants to frame B. This gives $X_B'^0$ and $X_B'^1$.
3. Since L_B has been obtained, S knows the fingerprinting pattern chosen by B. So S can embed the same pattern into any other content X'. Denote the fingerprinted content as X'_B.

4. S computes $TN'_B = E_J(H(X'_B), H(X'_B) \oplus H(L_B))$.
5. S initiates the **identification** protocol to frame B for pirating X'_B, by sending X'^0_B and X'^1_B together with transaction record $Rec'_B = \langle y_1, Cert(y_1), F^0_B, F^1_B, T_B, sig_{x_1}(T_B), TN'_B \rangle$ to the judge J.
6. J decrypts T_B and TN'_B and will correctly verify that L_B corresponds to X'_B, and that T_B was signed by B. It will also correctly detect in X'_B the presence of the fingerprinting pattern based on L_B. Thus, this will cause J to agree that B has pirated X'_B, and it will send y_1 to RC to ask for the identity of B, and informs S.

The second attack below also violates *non-framing* in the sense that even if B was dishonest and redistributed X_B, it should only be held guilty for X_B and not for any other content X'_B for which it did not redistribute. This is in line with the common legal system. If this is violated, it is still unfair to B; for instance if X_B is some inexpensive content whose copyright is claimed by S only for a brief period thus B might feel it is ok to redistribute among friends after some time. However, once X_B is obtained by S it can frame B for redistributing some other very expensive content X'_B and for which it holds copyright indefinitely. The attack follows.

1. S does not know the fingerprinting pattern based on L_B that was selected by B to be embedded into content X to form X_B. However, S does have the copies of X^0_B embedded with F^0_B, and of X^1_B embedded with F^1_B.
   Proceeding frame by frame in sequence, S compares each frame of X_B with each frame of X^0_B and of X^1_B. Since each frame is processed independently (like in electronic code book way), S will successfully obtain the fingerprinting pattern L_B.
2. The rest of the attack steps is similar to the steps 2 to 6 of the first attack above.

Our first attack exploits the fact that L_B can be bruteforced in practice, and that T_B can be used for verifying these guesses. Even if L_B is too long to be bruteforced in practice (but this is not the case for the Yong-Lee scheme), our second attack still applies. It exploits the fact that the seller S knows the fingerprint set $\{F^0_B, F^1_B\}$ used to embed into the content thus it can know the fingerprinting pattern chosen by the buyer B by simple frame comparison once a copy of the fingerprinted content X_B is available. In both attacks, the major flaw we exploit is the same for which we exploited in our attack on Seller Security in the previous subsection: that the only thing that binds to the buyer B is $sig_{x_1}(T_B)$, which is independent of the content bought by B. This allows the seller

S to transplant the same fingerprinting pattern to any other content for as many times as it wishes to frame B.

5 Concluding Remarks

The Yong-Lee BSW scheme attempts to eliminate the inefficiency of some existing BSW schemes by using symmetric key encryption and commutative encryption. The flaws that we have demonstrated on this scheme do not stem from the use of these encryption methods, but exploits the fact that the scheme was not sufficiently binding a buyer to the content. This causes a buyer to repudiate and thus get away with illegal redistribution of bought content, breaking seller security. This also makes it easier for a seller to transplant a buyer's fingerprint to other contents for framing, thus breaking buyer security.

Our results show that the Yong-Lee scheme does not offer the security for which it is designed to provide, and therefore leaves doubts on the design of this scheme, considering the state of the art of BSW schemes thus far, and the fact that the Yong-Lee BSW scheme is a fairly recent proposal that should have taken the state of the art into its design consideration. We caution against simple fixes that patch our attacks in this paper since experience has shown that the break-and-fix cycle loops indefinitely, for instance see [17–19, 30–32] where attacks were applied to protocols [8–11, 20, 22, 6, 36] that improved on existing ones. We suggest instead, that if BSW schemes are required, to consider other schemes like [24, 38] that have not been shown to fall to any attacks that counter their design goals.

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